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In this paper, I use the materials of the debate on the reliability and the utility of “business 
barometers” of the Twenties in order to show that the theoretical reflexions of the time 
could be used by economic historians as a working hypothesis to analyze the influence 
exerted by circulating statistical data on the decisions of economic operators and 
institutions. I offer a short illustration of the origins and circulation of economic trends 
forecasting in the first decades of 20th century, paying particular attention to the critical 
attitude shown by Corrado Gini and Oskar Morgenstern and to the debate arisen inside the 
Harvard Committee for Economic Research on the inefficiency of its “index of economic 
conditions” during the 1929 crisis. I finally suggest that thorough research on the 
circulation and the influence exerted by the Harvard index on the business world, still after 
the slump in prices of New York Stock Exchange, could contribute to explain the behaviour 
of American businessmen and investors during the first Thirties, and the deepening of the 
crisis. 
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Weather forecast or rain-dance? On inter-war business barometers. 
 
1.  I present here the framework of a research, still far from being 
concluded, on the influence of statistical information on the choices of 
single and institutional operators. Focusing on the inter-war period, I use the 
so-called “business barometers” of the Twenties and the debate of the time 
on the effects of economic forecasting in order to draw some indications to 
interpret the mechanics of the crisis of the Thirties in the United States. 
       My intervention will be divided as follows: first, a short illustration of 
the origins and circulation of economic forecasting in the first decades of 
20th century; second, an analysis of the international debate on business 
barometers, with particular attention to the critical attitude shown by 
Corrado Gini and Oskar Morgenstern in their writings; third, a detailed 
reconstruction of the debate on the failure of Harvard most-renowned 
barometer in forecasting the 1929 crash. Finally, I suggest a hypothesis on 
the role Harvard-inspired barometers played in pushing American 
businesses to take the wrong decisions during the first Thirties, so making 
the situation worse. 
          3
       2.  In the first decades of the twentieth century statistical information on 
economic events opened up to a larger public of businessmen. This was 
mainly caused by the action of major operators. Besides the State, big 
corporations and banks were well acquainted with the advantages of a 
systematical examination of current events. Still, they preferred that also 
smaller operators were not too much unaware of market conditions, as to 
avoid sharp and unforeseeable shocks in the general course of business 
(Ayres 1924). So they thought it would be useful to spread the news 
gathered by their research departments by means of informatory circulars, in 
order to avoid market turbulence capable of threatening investment stability. 
       Later  on,  specialized  agencies started gathering, processing and 
publishing data, putting services born inside private companies (but soon 
externalized) at the public's disposal. The first business indicators appeared 
in the United States before the war as an instrument to get speculative 
profits (Sauvy, 1948, 15). In short, it was a matter of meeting the business 
demand for statistically based forecasts (Armatte, 1992, 130-131). 
       Commercial forecasting agencies like the Brookmire Economic Service 
and the Babson Statistical Organization produced business barometers based 
on simple principles - that still did not seem trivial to their public. As we 
shall see later on, some scholars complained of such publications offering 
businessmen “nothing but the photograph of the forecasts they've just made, 
so that they take a line with their action” (Gini, 1930, 243). On the other 
hand, as Roger Babson himself (quoted in Armatte, 1992, 133) pointed out,   4
barometers met a need for objective information which actors themselves, 
too concerned in their respective group strategies, cannot answer directly.  
       First  business  barometers  were the result of complex elaborations, 
which still had the aim of offering simple and univocal interpretations of 
data, mainly by means of graphical representations incorporating the same 
interpretation. Only in the post-war period did more authoritative academic 
researchers start dealing with business cycle analysis, which seemed to be a 
most promising field of investigation in economic statistics. In 1919, the 
Committee for Economic Research of Harvard University began editing a 
business barometer, periodically published in the Review of economic 
statistics. 
       It is now worth explaining briefly how business barometers worked. 
The most famous ones were the above-mentioned Babson and Brookmire, 
as well as the Harvard forecasting system. The Babsonchart - published 
since 1910 - consisted of a “composite index” of United States economic 
activity, built up by weighting some “sensitive” indexes, and plotted as a 
broken line on a graph with time in abscissa and index values in ordinate. 
The resulting curve was interpolated by the “X-Y line”, “corresponding to 
the general business growth, to the increase of wealth in the considered 
period”. The “X-Y line” was built up in order that it roughly equalized areas 
included between it and the “composite index” curve. The forecasting 
mechanism of such a barometer originated from “Newton's action and 
reaction principle” or, in less bombastic words, from the assumption of 
approximate equivalence between the areas representing booms and the   5
ones representing depressions. The Babson Statistical Organization kept the 
way the “X-Y line” was concretely built up secret for a long time. But 
Babson’s forecast were actually also relying on relentless surveys of leading 
businessmen’s opinions (Friedman, 2006, 12-13), this way working also as 
sort of an “index of the confidence” of investors. 
              The Brookmire Economic Service barometer was based on a 
completely different principle. Economic events were summarily classified 
into three groups: banking, speculation and business. Forecasts were based 
on the observation that most of the times “when banking starts a main 
variation (increase or decrease), stock prices will follow some months later 
and some more months later indicators of general business trends” (Vance, 
1925, 79). It is clear that such a forecasting system involved the opinion, 
inspired by the works of Irving Fisher, that money and credit are the 
independent variable in business cycle (widely quoted in Brookmire, 1913). 
As it was based on the systematic examination of sequences between the 
trends of different indexes, Brookmire was an immediate precursor of the 
most sophisticated barometer built up by the Harvard Committee for 
Economic Research and published starting from January 1919. 
       The Harvard Committee director, Warren M. Persons, was convinced 
that existing barometers could be surpassed by means of a sharper 
distinction between gathering and publishing data, on the one hand, and 
analyzing and interpreting them, on the other. Therefore the Committee 
started manipulating published monthly economic data series, in order to 
correct them for seasonal variation and for the “secular (long-time) trend”;   6
they then continued, charting each series as thus corrected in order to 
compare its fluctuations with others. Afterwards, the series were classified 
into groups according to the timing of their cyclical variations. Only at this 
point did they undertake the construction, out of the series included within 
any such group, of a composite series reflecting the average course of 
fluctuation for the group as a whole, and these “composite indexes” were 
superposed “upon a single chart” (Bullock-Crum, 1932, 132). 
       “No theory as to the interrelations of various aspects of the economic 
movement had been in mind when the investigation was undertaken”. 
Nevertheless, “the results showed that (1) each of the three curves was 
associated with a particular type of economic activity”; “and (2) the 
relations of the three curves to each other at any given time appeared to 
afford a sound basis for forecasting”. This way, many years later, Bullock 
and Crum (1932, 132-133) claimed the empirical origin of the Harvard 
method, based on the sequentiality of curves A (speculation), B (business) 
and C (money and credit). 
       The order of the curves could give the wrong impression that changes in 
C (money conditions) were not important as a barometer of general business 
conditions, since they occurred after changes in B (business). As a matter of 
fact, the Harvard Committee used since 1920 both the A and the C curves in 
its forecasts of the B curve movements: in particular, “a decrease in A and a 
simultaneous increase in C” indicated the approaching crisis (Bullock-
Persons-Crum, 1927, 77). As Persons (1930, 290) pointed out, this meant 
that the forecasts could be put in terms of causation as well as in terms of   7
lag: money and credit availability (C) was actually the determining factor, 
influencing firstly the expectations of speculators (A) and then general 
business conditions (B). The actual sequence was hence C-A-B, where the 
relationship between C and the other curves was reversed. 
        
       3. The success of Harvard barometer derived mainly from its correct 
forecast of the timing of the 1920-1921 crisis, which unexpectedly hit the 
American economy. After this episode, a lot of businesses started using 
forecasts issued by Harvard, and by other private agencies. At the same 
time, the Federal Reserve System started its monetary interventions in order 
to regulate business trends: the not-so-good results of forecasting in 1923 
were explicitly ascribed to the effects of Fed interventions, which modified 
the sequence of the curves.  
              Ironically, the influence of the Harvard barometer on business grew 
wider as its forecasting mechanism started jamming. The 1921 success gave 
the Harvard “business conditions index” a national- and international-wide 
renown. The methods in use by the Committee for Economic Research for 
the statistical depuration of series and for measuring the correlation between 
different series were adopted by commercial forecasting agencies, 
sometimes with naivety and sometimes with following polemics on their 
right use (see Karsten, 1926; Bullock-Persons-Crum, 1927). The same 
forecasting methods were also adopted by some big businesses in order to 
plan their orders and investments: American Telegraphs and Telephones 
used the Harvard methodology to build up a barometer on its own, and   8
General Motors usually confronted Harvard forecasting with its own sales 
estimations (Richardson, 1929, 184-189).  
       Born as agile business reports, during the Twenties barometers rose to 
scientific respectability. At the end of the decade, central banks and 
governments based their interventions on this kind of data. Barometers were 
no longer a simple way of rationalizing individual behavior on the market; 
they had become the empirical basis of a policy devoted to institutional 
regulation of the market itself. As such, they went parallel with the 
establishment of big offices and workshops which, by means of a wide and 
careful collection of data and news on economic life trends, could with 
certainty point out approaching crises: many institutes and publications 
taking as their model the Harvard Committee and its “business conditions 
index” were founded in the European countries during the Twenties.  
       In the United Kingdom, the London and Cambridge Economic Service 
was established under the direction of William Beveridge in 1921. In 
France, the Statistical Institute of Paris University was set up in the same 
year by Lucien March. Institutes for economic trends forecast were 
established in those years also in Vienna, where Hayek and then 
Morgenstern were appointed as directors, in Moscow, under the direction of 
Kondratieff, and in Berlin, where Ernst Wagemann (1930) developed a 
much more detailed system of indexes (Morgan, 1990, 66; Deblock 2000). 
In some cases, caution prevailed. The Swedish Ministry of Commerce 
published a barometer modeled on the Harvard one, but being afraid of 
exaggerated expectations of the industrial world, suspended publication and   9
resumed it only after drawing the cautions required for its interpretation to 
the attention of the public. In Italy, the Universities of Padua and Rome 
started publishing the “Indici del movimento economico italiano”, still 
excluding any forecasting concerns, in view of the doubts expressed on the 
matter by the president of the publishing committee, Corrado Gini (1926): 
Gini (1930, 245) defined the indexes compiled by the Italian committee as a 
“rain gauge” with respect to forecasting “barometers”.  
              In 1926, the institution of a Committee of experts on business 
barometers on the initiative of the League of Nations was a sign of the 
increasing importance attributed to business cycle analysis. Such a 
committee was established considering that “a better evaluation of all data 
concerning economic factors” should be “useful in steering credit policy, so 
to partially soften the extreme fluctuations of economic activity, which is 
harmful to investment steadiness” (Gini, 1926, 4). Persons (1930, 307) 
himself, speaking at the Warsaw meeting of the International Statistical 
Institute in August 19291, put the steady prosperity of the Twenties in the 
United States down to the greater knowledge of the current facts of 
business, but also to the growing experience of the Fed in utilizing this 
knowledge in monetary policy. Thus, the forecasting work of the Harvard 
Committee and other agencies found its operating effect in the stabilization 
policy that the Fed carried out in the same years. 
It’s worth to say that some criticism on this optimistic view did 
emerge since the Twenties: I will focus here on Corrado Gini’s and Oskar 
Morgenstern’s writings on this matter.    10
              Gini (1926, 4) started from the above-mentioned meeting of the 
Committee of experts on business barometers in December 1926, which he 
attended, to “examine some problems raised during the discussions that took 
place there or were born in [his] mind following on these ones”.  
       Taking a remark of Pantaleoni (1924, 347), Gini began by considering 
the eponymous metaphor of new statistical devices (used for the first time in 
De Foville, 1888): “between business barometers and meteorological ones 
there lies an essential difference: the reports of meteorological barometers 
do not exert – of course – any influence on what will be the weather like, 
whereas the reports of business barometers can influence considerably 
business trends”. 
       According to this observation, at the beginning he admitted the validity 
of the point of view of the League of Nations, connecting an improvement 
in the economic forecasts to an increase in the credit policy effectiveness. It 
was reasonably likely that the lag between discount rate movements and 
business fluctuations would be reduced because of more widespread and 
ready knowledge of those fluctuations. But this kind of relationship was 
more general: “the widespread knowledge of economic indexes tends to go 
through, and at any rate makes shorter, the lapse of time between related 
movements of several economic variables”. Therefore, where 
interdependence exists between two variables, “the reaction of the belated 
variable on the earlier one” will be “ahead of time because of this 
knowledge”. Still, only if “this reaction, as it is the case of the business 
fluctuations and the discount rate, is fulfilled as a compensation”, will the   11
effect be that of “mitigating fluctuations of earlier variable”. Should that not 
be the case – as, in his opinion (Gini, 1926, 14-15), it happened most of the 
times (in the relationship between prices and wages, or between domestic 
and external prices) – “the belated variable tends with its variations to react 
on the earlier variable, which determines it, making its variations more 
marked”, this way triggering off, instead of a regulation mechanism, “a 
vicious circle”. 
       To sum up, Gini wished for a development of money and credit control 
as an instrument to mitigate economic fluctuations, but was persuaded that a 
wider circulation of economic information would have pro-cyclical and, at 
worst, destabilizing effects. It is interesting to see the consonance between 
this argument and the criticism by Oskar Morgenstern (1928, summarized in 
Marget, 1929) on the circulation of economic forecasts.  
       Morgenstern started by denying any possibility of applying the theory 
of probability to economics, given the lack of homogeneity and statistical 
independence of economic data. In his opinion, the Harvard Committee was 
not applying the statistical theory of probability to its data, but a 
“semiological” theory of causes, which could be falsified. This 
“experiment” could be very useful in order to foster the development of 
economic theory, allowing it to test the causal connections it was supposing. 
But when its results were circulated to the public and found practical use in 
steering entrepreneurial choices and institutional economic policy, they 
could have destabilizing effects. In fact, a widespread reliance on economic   12
forecasts endangered the “rationality” of economic processes by modifying 
entrepreneurs’ “reference points”.  
Morgenstern concluded pointing out the need to separate the 
scientific research on business trends from the sale of a forecasting service 
to the public, but also from its use for monetary policy. Interestingly, it was 
starting from his 1928 analysis of the conditions and possibilities of 
economic forecast that Morgenstern developed his considerations on the 
“perfect forecasting” problem. The same idea that “the calculation of the 
effects of our choices is always based on the expected choices of the others” 
was at the origin of his first contributions on game theory (von Neumann – 
Morgenstern, 1944).  
This opens an attractive path of research in the history of economic thought, 
which is not the case to follow here. Also from the point of view of the 
history of economic thought, the literature has already shown how following 
developments in economic science brought this empirical approach to the 
study of business cycles, so strong in the Twenties, to lose its dominant role 
in the Thirties. For instance, it would be possible to make reference to Udny 
Yule (1926) radical criticism of statistical correlations between time-series, 
or to the concurrent “development of the alternative quantitative programme 
in econometrics” (Morgan, 1990, 67). But let’s go back to the story of the 
Harvard barometer, and then to economic history.  
        
 4.  Only  two  months  after the extensive discussion which the 
International Statistical Institute devoted to economic forecasts in 1929, the   13
Wall Street crack – unforeseen and undervalued by the Harvard Committee 
– gave a great blow to economic statistics forecasting ambitions. In the 
Thirties business barometers (which went on forecasting a rapid recovery) 
were made commercially useless by the Great Depression. In 1935 the 
Harvard Index stopped coming out, and the Harvard Economic Society shut 
down the Committee on Economic Research. Other barometers passed away 
in the same years.  
  Why the forecasting performance of the Harvard 
barometer was so poor in this occasion? Joseph Schumpeter 
(1954, 1165) is one of the historians who assert that Persons 
and his team were only too aware of the risk of a distorted or 
mechanical reading of the forecasts circulating in the “Weekly 
Report” of the “Review of Economic Statistics”. Was it this 
very awareness that made Harvard statisticians so careful that 
they “either would not believe their own methods or else would 
not take what they believed to be a serious responsibility in 
predicting depression” in 1929? Did Persons and his colleagues 
at the Harvard Committee for Economic Research decline the 
responsibility of forecasting the crash? 
  The Committee itself had a different version, if we rely 
on an article explicitly accounting for the interpretation and 
performance of the Index. Bullock and Crum (1932, 138) relate 
that, “during the short post-war cycle that ended in the 
depression of 1921, the performance of our Index” performed   14
very well. Still, after 1922 the situation became more 
complicated as, “with the gradual return of prosperity, the 
federal reserve authorities were free for the first time to 
develop credit policies suited to normal times”. The steps the 
Fed and the Department of Commerce took in those years to 
deal with the economic trend “introduced a new factor which 
seemed to make it absolutely necessary to supplement our 
index chart by independent study” (Bullock and Crum, 1932, 
139). 
That was why the Committee preferred to take a careful 
attitude when, in the summer of 1928, the relative positions of 
the A and C curves seemed to point to “the approach of a 
cyclical decline into depression”. The prevailing opinion was 
that the A, B and C curves were not to be read mechanically, 
and in fact “the avoidance of a mechanical reading proved 
correct during the next eight or nine months”. So, when “the 
chart gave a new and much more emphatic warning” in the 
spring of 1929, this once again went unheeded. And yet, “if 
followed mechanically, the chart would have given a 
satisfactory forecast even of the extraordinary developments 
late in 1929”.  
What was then that drove the Harvard statisticians to 
underrate their own index indications so stubbornly? Following 
the account of Bullock and Crum, it would be essentially the   15
lack of an analysis of the international situation, which 
concealed “the unfavorable effects which high money rates in 
this country” were producing in Europe and elsewhere (Bullock 
and Crum, 1932, 142). For such a development the Committee 
should have been prepared. Still, having “seen the intervention 
of the federal reserve authorities prove effective in averting 
serious situations in the fall of 1927 and the fall of 1928”, it 
“counted upon similar action in 1929 if, as seemed likely, it 
should become necessary”.  
Hence, it would be the confidence in the effectiveness of 
Fed intervention that would drive the Harvard Committee to 
underestimate the first repeated signs of the crisis that its own 
barometer showed. The attempt to blame the overconfidence on 
monetary authorities has been defined “very clumsy” by 
Christian Deblock (2000, 375). Still, the Committee’s self-
criticism of the limits of an analysis focused only on the 
American economy agrees with the results of present historical 
research on the 1929 crash (Eichengreen 1992), which blames 
the same limits in the attitude of the Fed. 
In August 1929, in the above-mentioned paper presented at 
the International Statistical Institute meeting, Persons (1930, 
293) himself had noticed the danger deriving from a 
difficulty of credit control. In 1928, the absorption of credit 
for speculative purposes forced the Federal Reserve System   16
to follow a vacillating money policy; this behavior led in 
1929 to an apparent "loss of control of the money market by 
the federal reserve banks".  
From this point of view, Persons’ version of the facts is 
different from Bullock and Crum’s: the Harvard Committee 
was not relying so blindly on the deus ex machina of Fed 
intervention. The problem was another: antislump 
interventions carried out in the previous decade had 
apparently altered "the time sequence, which had previously 
been observed between the cyclical fluctuations of 
speculation, business and money rates”.  
In the following session of the ISI in 1930, Persons (1931, 
487-488) was in his turn blaming the Fed intervention, but 
as “largely responsible for the change in relationships which 
we have described” between the curves. Since 1922, the 
intervals between the cyclical movements of the curves 
considerably shortened. In 1929, the movements of 
speculation (A) were even responding to, rather than 
preceding business (B), and the interest rate (C) was moving 
together with A and B, rather than following some months 
later. The Harvard Committee’s forecasting choices in 1929 
were hence based mainly on the awareness that the 
sequences were no more working, and on the consequent loss 
of confidence in its own forecasting mechanism: in   17
Schumpeter words, in this situation the responsibility of 
forecasting the crash was really too heavy. 
 
5.  The choice to focus in this paper on the case of the 
Harvard barometer should not be interpreted as a dismissal of 
the importance of other barometers and forecasting services in 
general. The main rival of Persons’ Committee was Irving 
Fisher’s Index Number Institute based in New Haven, CT, 
publishing the “Irving Fisher’s Business Page” on diferrent 
newspapers. Fisher’s forecasts were based on the 
presupposition that the determining variables in business 
fluctuations were entirely monetary, and could be measured by 
means of the quantity of circulating money and checking 
deposits. When the quantity of money rose, prices increased 
and, nominal interest rates being slow to respond, real interest 
rates fell: in this situation, businesses were pushed to invest 
excessively and, when interest rates finally rose, could not pay 
back their debts. At this point, banks restricted the credit, 
reducing the circulating quantity of money and pushing prices 
down (Friedman, 2006, 15-16). 
It is evident that also Fisher’s forecasting theory was 
jammed by the Federal Reserve antislump interventions on 
interest rates. Actually, both Harvard and Fisher missed the 
crash and remained optimist long after it. An econometric   18
analysis based on the same data of Harvard and Fisher and 
using modern time-series methods shows that the crash and the 
following Depression were actually not forecastable 
(Dominguez-Fair-Shapiro, 1988).  
Still, this does not mean that barometers had no effect on 
entrepreneurial choices. Making reference to Gini and 
Morgenstern’s critical remarks on the circulation of economic 
forecasting, it seems possible to argue that they could have 
partially modified entrepreneurs’ “points of orientation”. A 
first hypotesis I present here, still to be verified on sources, 
concerns what happened in the first years following the 1929 
crash. Actually, as a warning to the reader, it would be useful 
to say that the following last section of this paper is just a 
research project and not the result of exhaustive research. 
Following the optimism of forecasters on a huge 
recovery, some still-sound businesses could have been pushed 
to invest on credit, given the low relative prices of investment 
goods and the decrease in interest rates which followed the 
crash and went on until 1931. Their attempt to exploit a 
supposed temporary downturn would fail dramatically. The 
decrease of the money stock which followed the 1931 Fed 
decision to rise interest rates (Friedman-Schwarz, 1963), the 
permanent decline in aggregate demand (Temin, 1976), the 
collapse of commodity prices (Kindleberger, 1986) were all   19
working against the recovery. The consequence would be a 
further deepening of the Depression, caused by the bankrupt of 
most of surviving businesses, falling on the 1933 bank crisis.  
The economic and historical literature on the investment 
trend during the Depression (Steindl, 1951; Bernstein, 1987) 
offers a lot of data useful to verify the compatibility of this 
hypothesis with the general economic trend. Business case 
studies on major companies allow, on the other hand, checking 
the timing of investment choices of single businesses and their 
sources of information. The successful use of sales reports by 
the General Motors Co. (Kuhn, 1986) or the introduction of 
internal comptrollers at Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Emmet-Jeuck, 
1950) suggest that when businesses were able to collect and 
use the information that was really concerning them, they 
could react to the crisis. Still, this is a matter of very big 
businesses: smaller companies were relying on market 
information and probably on general forecasts.  
It would then be interesting to know exactly which firms were 
subscribers receiving the “Weekly Report” of the Harvard Committee, and 
to know if they were using it in their decision-making process.  
The papers of the Harvard Committee are deposited at the Becker 
Library, and include (according to the website): 1) forms, data, newspapers 
and journals used as sources for the elaboration of forecasts; 2) minutes of 
the periodical meetings of the Committee, offering details of forecasting   20
choises; 3) drafts of the “Weekly Report” and of “Review of Economics and 
Statistics”, useful for an analysis of publication choices, with a list of 
subscribers; 4) the correspondence with other institutes, scholars, 
businessmen, entrepreneurs and readers, allowing to check the circulation 
and the debate on the barometer.  
Starting from this material, it would be possible not only to get to the 
bottom of the different versions of the unforecasted 1929 crash given by 
Persons, and Bullock and Crum, but also have a measure of the circulation 
of barometers in the business environment, and a list of the businesses 
directly using the Committee Report. A second step of the research could be 
to check the archives of these businesses, where existing, in order to find 
documentation of the correspondence with the Harvard Committee and 
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